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Article 5

Comment

Sealing and Expungement of
Criminal Records: Avoiding the
Inevitable Social Stigma
Big government, the expanding use of computers, and the constant proba highly scutinized,
ing into our lives by countless organizations make us
1
watched, counted, recorded and questioned people.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past several years there has been a growing concern over
the kind of information that is collected and disseminated about an
individual.2 In an ever increasingly computerized society, one becomes curious about the information "Big Brother" has stored
about us.3 Of this tremendous amount of information collected,
1. Miller, Our Right of Privacy Needs Protectionfrom the Press, 7 HumAN RiGHTS
16, 18 (Spring 1978).
2. One reason for the concern is that "the federal government today maintains
6,723 different record systems containing a total of 3.9 billion individual files,
or eighteen files for every man, woman and child in the United States!"
Caine, Computers and the Right to Be Let Alone-A Civil Libertarian View,
22 VmL. L. REv. 1181, 1183 (1977).

3. One commentator has related the following incident:
Recently, a group of police officers were touring a police records department. After hearing an explanation of how data could be obtained from the computer by the mere entry of a person's name, one
officer requested that his name be entered so he could see the system operate. Although it was suggested that such a demonstration
would be pointless because the officer would have no record, the request was complied with. To everyone's surprise, particularly the officer who had made the request, the computer responded that the
person had once been suspected of being a "peeping tom." Understandably upset, the officer immediately commenced an investigation to discover why this entry was on his record. He eventually
learned the explanation. At one time a woman living in an apartment
complex reported a peeping tom, and as a matter of course the
names of all the male residents of the apartment complex were put
on a list of "suspects." The officer, since he resided in the apartment
complex at the time, was included in this list. He was never contacted, questioned or even aware of being a suspect. Nevertheless
this information became part of his computer record.
Comment, The Rights of the Innocent Arrestee: Sealing of Records Under CaliforniaPenal Code Section 851.8, 28 HASTINGs L.J. 1463, 1465 n.15 (1977).
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there is probably none that poses such potential for abuse and
misuse as well as a threat to an individual's privacy and reputation
4
as does the collection of arrest and conviction records.
It has been estimated that about forty percent of the male children living in the United States today will at some time be arrested
for a non-traffic offense. 5 Additionally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has amassed some 200 million sets of fingerprints. 6 Thus, it is quite likely that an individual might have been
involved in an activity which would have generated "a record at
almost every level of the criminal justice system-from the police
department, through the courts, to the FBI.'' 7 Of course, generation of the record in and of itself does not pose a tremendous problem. 8 But the presentation of the record and disclosure of its
contents to others have caused much concern about the dangers of
inaccurate or incomplete records, dissemination outside the criminal justice system, and reliance on such records as a basis for denying business or professional licensing, employment, or other
opportunities for personal advancement. 9 To afford protection to
4. Throughout this comment the term "criminal record" will be used to refer to
both arrest and conviction records. "Conviction record" will be used when
the arrest resulted in a conviction and if the arrestee was exonerated the information will be referred to as an "arrest record."
5. Comment, Expungement and Sealing of Arrest and Conviction Records: The
New Jersey Response, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 864, 868 (1974) (citing THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 247 (1967) [hereinafter cited as THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME]). See also note 40 infra.

6. Comment, supra note 5, at 874 n.48.
7. Comment, The Press and CriminalRecord Privacy,20 ST.Louis U.L.J. 509, 511
(1976)

(footnote omitted).

8. Comment, supra note 5, at 868 n.22.
9. See, e.g., Hess & Le Poole, Abuse of the Record of Arrest Not Leading to Conviction, 13 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 494, 495-98 (1967); Karabian, Record of Arrest: The Indelible Stain, 3 PAC. L.J. 20, 21-24 (1972); Schiavo, Condemned by
the Record, 55 A.B.A.J. 540, 541-42 (1969); Steele, A Suggested Legislative Device for Dealingwith Abuses of CriminalRecords, 6 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 32, 3842 (1972); Comment, The Arrest Record and New York City Public Hiring: An
Evaluation, 9 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PRoB. 442, 445-48 (1973); Comment, Arrest
Records-Protecting the Innocent, 48 TUL. L. REV. 629, 634-36 (1974); Comment, Arrest Records as a Racially DiscriminatoryEmployment Criterion, 6
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165, 168-71 (1970); Comment, Guilt by Record, 1 CAL.
W. L. REV. 126, 126-29 (1965); Comment, Maintenance and Dissemination of
Criminal Records: A Legislative Proposal, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 654, 664-65
(1972); Comment, Removing the Stigma of Arrest: The Courts, The Legislatures and Unconvicted Arrestees, 47 WASH. L. REV. 659, 660-62 (1972); Comment, Retention and Disseminationof Arrest Records: Judicial Response, 38
U. CHI. L. REV. 850, 853 (1971); Note, A ConstitutionalRight to the Return of
Fingerprintsand Photographson Acquittal, 37 Mo. L.REV. 709, 713-14 (1972);
Note, Discriminationon the Basis of Arrest Records, 56 CORNELL L REV. 470,
470-75 (1971); Note, The Disseminationof Arrest Records in the Iowa TRACIS
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individuals with arrest or conviction records the principal development 0 has been providing for expungement or sealing" of such
records.
This comment will explore the problems which expungement
and sealing are aimed at solving,' 2 examine the judicial response
to the problem, and describe different approaches certain state legislatures have adopted. The arguments for and against retention
of criminal records will be discussed and the need for some type of
legislative response in Nebraska will be suggested.
II. THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM
Suppose you are waiting in a park late at night for a friend to
pick you up and the police erroneously charge you on a suspicion
of being a prowler in the neighborhood.' 3 Or suppose you've taken
a cab home and only have a twenty dollar bill with which to pay

10.

11.

12.

13.

Bill, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1162, 1163-66 (1974); 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 825, 830 (1971).
See generally Alexander & Walz, Arrest Record Expungement in California:
The Polishing of Sterling, 9 U.S.F. L. REV. 299 (1974); Baum, Wiping Out a
Criminalor Juvenile Record, 40 STATE BAR J. 816 (1965); Booth, The Expungement Myth, 38 L.A. BAR BULL. 161 (1963); Kogon & Doughery, Sealing and
Expungement of CriminalRecords-The Big Lie, 61 J. CIM. L. C. & P. S. 378
(1970); Comment, CriminalRecords of Arrest and Conviction: Expungement
From the GeneralPublic Access, 3 CAL. W. L. REv. 121 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Expungement from the General Public];Note, ConstitutionalLawMaintenanceand Disseminationof Records of Arrest Versus The Right to Privacy, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 995 (1971); 8 Loy. L. A. L. REV. 238 (1975).
Relief was historically provided by the king as an act of grace and by executive pardon procedures. Comment, supra note 5, at 865. More recently, some
jurisdictions have provided relief through automatic restoration statutes.
Special Project-The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23
VAND. L. REV. 929, 1143 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CollateralConsequences].
Various jurisdictions define expungement and sealing differently and some
use the terms interchangeably. In general, sealing does not purport to destroy the record, whereas expungement connotes physical destruction.
When a record or proceeding is expunged it is as though the event giving rise
to the record had never happened in the first place. Sealing statutes usually
provide "that all government records relating to an offender's criminal record
are closed to public inspection." Collateral Consequences, supra note 10, at
1149 n.627. See also BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 693 (4th ed. 1968) which defines
"expunge" as "to destroy or obliterate; it implies not a legal act, but a physical annihilation."
The correct noun form for the act of expunging is "expunction." See WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 803 (2d ed. 1934). But the courts, legislators and
commentators almost uniformly use the word expungement and this comment will also follow that form.
This comment will not deal with the expungement of juvenile records, but an
excellent discussion of the area can be found in Gough, The Expungement of
AdjudicationRecords of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of Status,
1966 WASH. U. L.Q. 147.
Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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the driver. He has no change and puts you under citizen's arrest
for refusing to pay his fare. 14 In both situations the charges were
dropped but a criminal record arose out of both incidents. Severe
disabilities could result from disclosure of these arrest records
even though the arrests did not result in convictions. The problem
is that only lip service is given to the presumption that a person is
innocent until proven guilty. Furthermore, when a conviction does
occur and the individual has served time and paid a fine, then is it
not true that the offender has "paid his debt to society"? In response, one commentator has observed that though payment is
tendered, the individual "'neither receives a receipt nor is free of
his account.' ",15 Apparently the prominent belief is that "an arrest
is tantamount to guilt"' 6 and once found guilty the individual is
stigmatized indefinitely, resulting in a "record prison"' 7 in which
people are incarcerated by their criminal history records.' 8
A.

The "Record Prison"

There are numerous ways a past criminal record may be used
within the criminal justice system. The record may be used as an
investigative tool by the police, to solve similar crimes or obtain
further evidence. 19 Reasonable or probable cause for making an
arrest might arise when the modus operandi of a crime is similar
to that described in a suspect's record.20 Thus, a person with an
arrest record is more likely to become a suspect in police investigations. One court has stated that "it is common knowledge that a
man with an arrest record is much more apt to be subject to police
and the last eliminated as a
scrutiny-the first to be questioned
21
suspect in an investigation."
14. Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962). See
also Alexander & Walz, supra note 9.
15. Gough, supra note 12, at 148 (quoting Tappan, Loss and Restoration of the
Civil Rights of Offenders, 1952 NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE A. Y.B. 86, 87).
16. Comment, supra note 7, at 512. See also Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417
F.2d 728, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Comment, DiscriminatoryHiring PracticesDue
to Arrest Records-PrivateRemedies, 17 VILL. L. REV. 110, 112-13 (1971); Note,
The Dissemination of Arrest Records and the Iowa TRACIS Bill, 59 IowA L.
REV. 1162, 1167 (1974); 41 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 106 (1972).
17. The concept is explained in greater detail in DeWeese, Reforming Our "Record Prisons'" A Proposalforthe FederalRegulation of Crime Data Banks, 6
RUT.-CAm. L. J. 26, 48 (1974).
18. Comment, supra note 7, at 513.
19. Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 865, 553 P.2d 624, 628, 132 Cal. Rptr.
464, 468 (1976).
20. Comment, supra note 5, at 866. See also A. NEIER, DossIER ch. 10 (1975); DeWeese, supra note 17.
21. Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 127, 503 P.2d 157, 159 (1972).
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An example of the problem is illustrated by White v. State,22
where a person with a record of one prior arrest was identified
from a "mug shot" as a suspect in a check forgery case. The prosecutor subsequently decided not to prosecute because White was
not in the state and only a small amount of money was involved.
However, because of the arrest record White was denied employment as a police officer and was not successful at obtaining other
jobs. White sued the state for libel and negligence but a judgment
of nonsuit was entered. 23 The court reasoned that the state was
protected from tort liability by a conditional privilege. 24 It seems
clear, then, that those with a previous record stand an extremely
good chance of being rearrested some time in their lives. Such a
practice imposes a tremendous "undeserved handicap [especially]
for an innocent arrestee. '2 5
The prior record can be used for a variety of other purposes at
other stages of the criminal process as well. Prior records are
often taken into account in deciding whether an offense should be
charged, whether a felony or misdemeanor should be prosecuted
and whether a plea bargain should be accepted. 26 Once a person
22. 17 Cal. App. 3d 621, 95 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1971).
23. Id. at 630, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
24. The dissent argued that the individual's interests were not being sufficiently
protected:
Our nation's current social developments harbor insidious evolutionary forces which propel us toward a collective, Orwellian society.
One of the features of that society is the utter destruction of privacy,
the individual's complete exposure to the all-seeing, all-powerful police state. Government agencies, civilian and military, federal, state
and local, have acquired miles and acres of files, enclosing revelations of the personal affairs and conditions of millions of private individuals. Credit agencies and other business enterprises assemble
similar collections. Information peddlers burrow into the crannies of
these collections. Microfilm and electronic tape facilitate the storage
of private facts on an enormous scale. Computers permit automated
retrieval, assemblage and dissemination. These vast repositories of
personal information may easily be assembled into millions of dossiers characteristic of a police state. Our age is one of shriveled privacy. Leaky statutes imperfectly guard a small portion of these
monumental revelations. Appellate courts should think twice,
should locate a balance between public need and private rights,
before deciding that custodians of sensitive personal files may with
impunity refuse to investigate claims of mistaken identity or other
error which threaten the subject with undeserved loss. The office of
judges is to strike that balance rather than pursue sentiments of indignation or sympathy. It is obvious, nevertheless, that an unwarranted record of conviction, even of arrest, may ruin an individual's
reputation, his livelihood, even his life.
Id. at 631, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 181-82 (Friedman, J., dissenting in part, concurring
in part) (footnotes omitted).
25. Comment, supra note 3, at 1467.
26. DeWeese, supra note 17, at 82.
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has been charged, a prior record may be used to decide the question of pretrial release. Prior arrests and their dispositions will be
considered by the court in determining whether the defendant
should be released on recognizance or, if not, the amount of bail
that should be fixed. 27 After trial and upon conviction, probation
and parole authorities may use the arrest record in determining
whether and upon what conditions to grant probation or when to
release a defendant on parole.28
Not only does a prior record act to "imprison" an individual in a
"recokd prison" within the criminal justice system, but it has similar effects without. For.example, licensing boards consider a prior
record in deciding whether to revoke or deny a license. 29 Because
of the widespread dissemination of these records, 30 applicants may
have difficulty in obtaining insurance, credit 3 ' or admission to cer32
tain schools.
B.

"Above all else, employers are leery of any job applicant who has
ever been arrested. Not necessarily convicted of a crime-just
33
arrested."

Disclosure of criminal records may have an overwhelming impact on one's ability to seek and hold "gainful" employment. 34 A
27. Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d at 867-68, 533 P.2d at 630, 132 Cal. Rptr. at
470 (1976).
28. Id.
29. Most statutes require that applicants be of "good moral character." Comment, supra note 5, at 867 n.16. For other licensing restrictions placed upon
ex-offenders, see J. HuNT, J. BOWERS & N. MILLER, LAWS, LICENSES AND THE
OFFENDER'S RIGHT TO WORK (ABA Comm'n on Correctional Facilities and
Services) (1973).
30. One study in the District of Columbia revealed that more than 3,500 criminal
arrest records were disseminated weekly to private employers. See Morrow
v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (citing COMMITrEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE EFFECTS OF POLICE ARREST RECORDS ON EMPLOYMENT IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT 9 (1967) [also referred to as the Duncan Re-

31.

32.
33.
34.

port]). The Duncan Report also found that in other major cities there was a
similar practice of giving influential employers access to police records.
V. PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY 54 (1964); Note, Arrest and Credit Records:
Can the Right of Privacy Survive?,24 U. FLA. L. REV. 681 (1972). But see Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (5) (1976) which prohibits the reporting of arrest or conviction information seven years or older.
See, e.g., State v. Campobasso, 125 N.J. Super. 103, 308 A.2d 674 (1973) (petitioner removed from trade school until conviction, for being under the influence of a controlled substance, was expunged).
Hayden, How Much Does the Boss Need to Know?, 3 Cirv. LiB. REV. 23, 30
(Aug./Sept. 1976).
The enormous influence dissemination of arrest records has on a person's job
opportunities is documented in Hess & Le Poole, supra note 9; Karst, "The
Files'". Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal Data, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 342, 367 (1966); Collateral Conse-
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survey of New York City employment agencies indicated that
about seventy-five percent ask applicants if they have an arrest
record and generally do not refer those applicants who do, though
the arrest may not have led to a conviction.35 If two or more applicants apply for the same job, those with previous arrest records
"clearly stand in a less favorable position than do other applicants. ' 36 Employers often state as their reason for not hiring an
individual with a record is that their bond contract with the surety
an arrest record
company is voided if they hire individuals with
37
without the surety company's prior consent.
To a limited extent, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 38 may afford
some relief. In Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc.,3 9 the plaintiff was
denied employment because of a record of fourteen arrests, though
not one of them lead to a conviction. It was contended that because blacks are more prone to be arrested than whites, 40 Litton's
practice of refusing employment on the basis of arrest records rendered its policy racially discriminatory. 41 The court agreed and enjoined the company from such practice, noting that there was no
evidence to support the contention that an employee with several
arrests, but no convictions, 42 is less likely to be honest or reliable

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

quences, supra note 10, at 1001-18. See also Morrow v. District of Columbia,
417 F.2d 728, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Comment, Removing the Stigma of Arrest: The Courts, the Legislaturesand
Unconvicted Arrestees, 47 WASH. L. REV. 659, 660 (1972) (citing THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 5, at 75); See also note 30 supra.
Davidson v. Dill, 180 Colo. at 127, 503 P.2d at 159 and n.3.
Gough, supra note 12, at 158; Comment, The Expungement or Restriction of
Arrest Records, 23 CLEV. ST.L. REv. 123, 124 (1974).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), modified on othergrounds,472 F.2d 631 (9th
Cir. 1972).
One commentator has concluded that:
[t] he probability of arrest for urban males is quite high. For urban
black males the probability of arrest at least once during a lifetime
has been estimated to be as high as 90%. For white urban males the
figure is 60%, and for all males it is 47%. Fewer than 25% of those
arrested per year are found guilty of the offense for which they were
arrested, and only a little more than 25% are found guilty of any
crime at all. As the statistics show, the punishment which flows from
an arrest record works a disproportionate disadvantage against
blacks in the ghettos in cities throughout the United States.
Caine, supra note 2, at 1189 (citing PRESmENr's COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE ON SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY, at 216 (App. J) (1967)); CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE UNIFORM CRIME REP. 103, table 17 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
41. 316 F. Supp. at 403.
42. For a discussion of the problem as it relates to conviction records, see Green
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975); Note, Employment Discrimination-Title VII-Unlawful to Use Conviction Records as an Absolute Bar
to Employment, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 1251 (1976).
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than one without such a record. 43 Although the case gives some
hope to black applicants bringing actions under Title VII, it would
be difficult for a white applicant to gain similar relief."
C.

Admission to the Bar

Professional licensing statutes often require that applicants be
of "good moral character" or have not committed "crimes involving
moral turpitude. '45 This requirement has been generally accepted
as a permissible prerequisite for admission to the bar.46 It has also
been held that a47criminal record may reflect upon an applicant's
moral character.
In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners48 the Supreme Court
reversed a decision to exclude an applicant from the practice of
law for want of "good moral character. ' 49 The court asserted that a
state may require high standards of qualification before it admits
an applicant to the bar but the qualification must have a rational
connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice
law.50 Although the court did not hold that it was impermissible to
consider prior arrests, it did explain what significance such a record should have: "The mere fact that a man has been arrested has
very little, if any, probative value in showing that he engaged in
any misconduct. An arrest shows nothing more than that someone
probably suspected the person apprehended of an offense." 5 1
D.

Mass Arrests

In some jurisdictions there have been mass arrests of unpopular groups, sometimes for the purpose of harassment.5 2 For exam43. 316 F. Supp. at 402.
44. But see Comment, Arrest Records as a Racially DiscriminatoryEmployment
Criterion,6 HARv.Civ. LIB. L. REV. 165 (1970). The commentator argues that
since Title VII also prohibits sex discrimination and because males are arrested more often than females, denying males employment because of numerous arrests would also be prohibited.
45. See note 29 & accompanying text supra.
46. See Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d 192 (1978).
47. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
48. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
49. The applicant had been a member of the Communist Party from 1932 to 1940;
he had used aliases to avoid job discrimination. He was arrested while participating in a strike in 1934 but was later released, and was arrested in 1940 on a
charge of violating the Federal Neutrality Act, but was again released. The
finding of bad moral character was held to lack the rational support required
by the due process clause because the evidence of character at the time of
the applicant's application was highly favorable. Id. at 239.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 241 (footnote omitted).
52. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880
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ple, in 1971 during the "May Day" antiwar demonstrations in
Washington, D.C., a total of 14,517 arrests were made.53 In Sullivan
v. Murphy5 4 a class action was brought on behalf of those arrested
during the week-long disorder,5 5 seeking relief for the abridgment
of their fourth amendment rights. In deciding whether relief was
appropriate, the court noted the importance of finding the existence of probable cause at the time of the arrests. Accordingly, it
explained that because of disorders in the District of Columbia following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the normal
arrest practice of the police became unworkable.5 6 A new procedure had been adopted whereby the officer would complete a
"Field Arrest Form" with relevant information, then turn the arrestee over to other personnel for booking and processing.5 7 This left
the arresting officers free to remain at the scene of the demonstration.
However, because of an anticipated increase in protest activity
the police chief decided that mass arrests were necessary and suspended the field arrest procedures.5 8 Many innocent persons were
swept up in the process. 59 Because of the large number of arrests,
and the departure from normal procedure, it was impossible to determine the validity of the arrests and detentions. Therefore, the
circuit court stated that the arrests were not entitled to the normal
inference of justification and held the arrests to be presumptively
(1973) (political demonstrators); Wilson v. Webster, 467 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir.
1972) (dictum); United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967) (civil
rights workers); Bilick v. Dudley, 356 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (political
meeting); Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated on
other grounds, 401 U.S. 987 (1971) (hippies); Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881
(E.D. Pa. 1968) (same).
53. Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 942 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880
(1973).
54. 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973).

55. The arrests were primarily for "disorderly conduct, violation of police lines,
unlawful assembly, and unlawful entry onto public property." Id. at 942.
56. The normal practice was for the arresting officer to escort the person arrested
on probable cause to the police station for booking and recording. However,
during the disorder the practice was unworkable because the police were
needed most on the street. Id. at 946.
57. Id.
58. The police chief's order came on May 3 and during that day 8,000 arrests were
made. The arrestees were loaded on vehicles and sent to detention centers.
Many were processed through a booking center composed of volunteers from
the Justice Department who had been told to record the arrestee's name, address and physical description. They were to enter disorderly conduct as the
charge and could choose from seven police officers to list under "name of
arresting officer." Id. at 951. Photographs and fingerprints, normally taken to
assist in identification, were taken to be used by police during "Prep" sessions before trial Id. at 969.
59. Id. at 949-50.
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invalid.60
Due to the unique circumstances of the case, the court concluded that the inherent equity powers of a federal court allowed it
61
to grant relief to remedy the infringement of the plaintiffs' rights.
Although the court left the decision of the precise relief to be
granted to the trial court, it did note that the order of relief should
limit:
maintenance and dissemination of the arrest records, and of all materials
obtained from persons taken into custody during the May Day protest, in
the absence of affirmative evidence produced by the Defendants to
demonstrate the existence 6of
2 probable cause either at the time of the arrest or subsequent thereto.

However, the court also indicated that placing the documents
under seal might be an adequate alternative to outright expungement, because it would protect the individuals' interests as well as
63
the government's.
Another incident of mass arrests resulted in Hughes v. Rizzo. 64
Certain young persons were apprehended during a series of arrests made to rid a park of hippies. 65 The arrests were found to be
66
invalid and no charges were ever brought against the arrestees.
They subsequently brought suit seeking expungement of their
records. The court held that they were entitled to relief and directed expungement of all arrest records and ordered the return or
67
destruction of photographs taken in connection with the arrests.
68
Similarly, in United States v. McLeod, a series of arrests and
prosecutions of blacks had been made, apparently to keep them
from registering to vote through intimidation. The court granted
relief by directing that all fines be returned and court costs incurred be reimbursed and in addition ordered the expungement of
all arrests and prosecution records. 69 It seems clear, therefore, as
the mass arrest cases demonstrate that
[a] n arrest without conviction is as much an indication of unlawful activity by the police as by the person arrested; yet, nothing appears on the
criminal record of the policeman for having committed an unlawful act.
When the policeman
applies for credit or for a job, there is no notation of
70
law infraction.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 970.
Id. at 971.
Id.
Id. at 973.
282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
Cf. Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969) vacated on other
grounds, 401 U.S. 987 (1971) (expungement ordered after finding that vagrancy statute under which arrests of young persons at a "hippie house" had
been made was unconstitutional).
282 F. Supp. at 885.
Id.
385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967).
Id. at 750.
Caine, supra note 2, at 1189.
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"Mistakes"

Equally reprehensible are a group of cases which can best be
classified as "mistakes," that is, situations of mistaken identity or
where the. individual was arrested and subsequent events unequivocally established innocence.7 ' Perhaps the most celebrated
case in this area is Menard v. Saxbe.72 A nineteen-year-old student was sitting in a park late at night while waiting for a friend.
There had been a complaint of a prowler in the vicinity and so
Menard was approached by the Los Angeles police and questioned. Although he explained his reason for being in the park and his
friend later arrived confirming his story, he was arrested and held
for two days without a complaint being filed. Subsequently the police released him when they found no basis upon which to charge
him with a crime. 73 However, his fingerprints and information concerning the "arrest" were automatically forwarded to the FBI.
Menard brought an action to compel removal of his fingerprints
and record of arrest from FBI files.74 The district court denied relief 75 but the court of appeals reversed,7 6 noting that Menard had
suffered more than mere personal distress. It recognized that
"[a]lthough Menard cannot point with mathematical certainty to
the exact consequences of his criminal file, we think it clear that he
has alleged a 'cognizable legal injury.' "77
The appellate court, however, did not order full expungement.
71. See, e.g., Irani v. District of Columbia, 272 A.2d 849 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971), appealfrom final order dismissed, 292 A.2d 804 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972) (innocent
bystander mistakenly arrested for parading without a permit); State v.
Pinkney, 33 Ohio Misc. 183, 290 N.E.2d 923 (Ct. C. P. 1972) (18 year old defendant indicted for first degree murder released and charges dropped when
other persbns confessed to the crime).
72. 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
73. It has been suggested that "in all probability the crime for which he was apprehended had never taken place." Caine, supra note 2, at 1184 (citing
Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 492 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
74. The incident was the subject of much litigation, including two reversals and
remands by the circuit court. See Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir.
1970), on remand, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971), rev'd sub nom., Menard v.
Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
75. 498 F.2d at 1019.
76. Id. at 1023.
77. Id. Accord, Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 868 (3d Cir. 1975), in which a high
school student was allowed to seek expungement of her FBI file. She became
the subject of an FBI investigation when she wrote a letter to an organization
on which the FBI had put a mail cover. Although the case did not involve a
criminal record the court noted that "[t] he threat that the file poses is analogous to the dangers inherent in the maintenance of arrest ifies." Id.

1098

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1087

Instead it agreed with the contention that the decision to expunge
must be made at the local level and thus suggested that an action
should be brought against the local law enforcement agencies. The
court did order Menard's fingerprints and file transferred from the
FBI's criminal index to the identification index.78 It held that
when the Bureau is given notification of a change in the description of a record from, e.g., one of arrest to one of "detention only,"
to "expunge" the notathe Bureau has a statutory responsibility
79
tion from its criminal identification files.
Another case where subsequent events made it clear that the
arrestee was erroneously charged is United States v. Hudson.8o
Plaintiff was arrested for murder but after evidence disclosed that
the decedent had committed suicide, the charges against him were
dismissed. He therefore sought expungement of his records and
the court granted such relief.81 It was explained that entering a
notation of no conviction would not be an adequate remedy since
"[t Ihe existence of an arrest record, whether amplified or not, and
whether or not followed by a conviction, will subject the arrestee to
a host of disabilities ....*82 The court went on to rest its decision
on constitutional grounds:
[F] alure to expunge an innocent person's arrest record violates constitutional protections, including the rights to privacy and due process. The
courts have a special obligation, within their area of jurisdiction, to call a
halt to the indiscriminate
accumulation of information that threatens pri83
vacy and liberty.

It thus, seems difficult to deny that criminal records (both arrest and conviction) are disseminated widely and relied upon to
the disadvantage of many former arrestees. The severe disabilities
attendant to the disclosure of these records are not limited to those
78. 498 F.2d at 1028.
79. Id. See also Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974) where the court
held that the FBI has a duty to prevent the dissemination of inaccurate arrest
and conviction records. The court based its opinion on 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1976)
which provides:
(a) The Attorney General shall
(1) acquire, collect, classify, and preserve identification, criminal identification, crime, and other records; and
(2) exchange these records with, and for the official use of, authorized officials of the Federal Government, the States,
cities, and penal and other institutions.
(b) The exchange of records authorized by subsection (a) (2) of this
section is subject to cancellation if dissemination is made
outside the receiving departments or related agencies.
(c) The Attorney General may appoint officials to perform the functions authorized by this section.
80. 16 Crim. L. Rep. 2468 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1975).
81. Id. at 2470.
82. Id. at 2468.
83. Id. at 2469.
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convicted of a criminal act. As the cases demonstrate, the potential for injury to the innocent individual is just as significant as it is
to the "ex-offender." 84 The pervasiveness of the problem has led
commentators to recommend sealing or expungement as necessary and desirable solutions. 85 However, the urgings have often
fallen on deaf ears as the courts have demonstrated reluctance to
utilize these remedies and the legislative response has been con86
fused and varied.
I. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM: EXPUNGEMENT AND
RECORD SEALING
A.

The Judicial Response-A Cautious Approach

When requested to order the return or destruction of criminal
records a majority of courts have been cautious in fashioning relief.87 In the absence of express legislative authority, there has
88
been reluctance to grant expungement or sealing in any form.
However, a number of courts, both state and federal, have in appropriate cases ordered expungement or sealing. Where relief is
granted, several factors 89 stand out as important: (1) there were
extraordinary circumstances such as an unconstitutional or illegal
arrest;90 (2) the facts convinced the court that "justice so required;"9' (3) innocence was unequivocally established; 92 and (4)
84. One federal court has described the problem graphically:
Any citizen, even one with an absolutely clean lifetime record of
not violating the law, through a series of circumstances could find
himself charged with a violation of the law even though he may be
entirely innocent of the charges. Our system of criminal justice will
in due course bring out the truth and he will be cleared. But his record will not be cleared. And although he has been cleared under our
laws, at any future time the cloud of the prosecution against him will
remain to all who one way or another gain access to it: be it inquiries
concerning employment, security clearance, political office or investigations concerning other criminal offenses.
United States v. Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75, 78-79 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
85. See note 9 supra.
86. See notes 154-82 & accompanying text infra.
87. This judicial reluctance indicates that there is inadequate protection against
the abuses of arrest record dissemination. In the case of conviction records
there is almost no hope for judicial relief. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 215 Pa. Super. Ct. 534, 258 A.2d 695 (1969) (order expunging conviction record reversed, there being no statutory or common law basis for such
relief).
88. Some courts avoid deciding the merits of a petition for expungement on the
basis of jurisdictional defects. For an analysis of the issue, see Comment,
supra note 5, at 871-72 nn. 30-32.
89. See generally id. at 878-79.
90. E.g., United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967); Hughes v. Rizzo,
282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
91. Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich. 1971).

1100

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:1087

in some cases relief was granted on a right of privacy theory. 93
1. The Federal Courts
There is no specific federal statute providing for expungement
of criminal records. 94 However, the inherent equity power of a federal court has been recognized in a number of cases as authorizing
an order of expungement. 95 For example, the petitioner in Kowall
v. United States9 6 had been convicted for failure to report for induction into the armed services, but because his conviction was
subsequently reversed the court ordered that all records of the arrest be expunged. In affirming the order of expungement the district court noted that "the logic of the natural law of remedies does
not set arbitrary limits on a federal court's jurisdiction to right
wrongs cognizable by the common law within the jurisdiction of
the court." 9 7 Having established its authority to grant expungement relief, the court adopted a balancing test 98 for determining
when such relief was warranted: "If it is found after careful analysis that the public interest in retaining records of a specific arrest
is clearly outweighed by the dangers of unwarranted adverse con92. E.g., Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Hudson,
16 Crim. L. Rep. 2468 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1975); State v. Pinkney, 33 Ohio Misc.
183, 290 N.E.2d 923 (Ct. C.P. 1972).
93. See United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967); Davidson v. Dill,
180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 (1972); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211
(1971). As to the continuing validity of the privacy theory after Paulv. Davis,
see notes 139-53 & accompanying text infra.
94. Federal law does provide for the cancellation of a record. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 534(b) (1976); note 79 supra. But the provision is seldom invoked and has
been criticized as ineffective. Comment, Criminal Law--FBI Retention of
CriminalIdentification Records-Tarlton v. Saxbe, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 151,
155-56 (1975).
95. E.g., Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880
(1973); Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
96. 53 F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
97. Id. at 213.
98. "[T] he harm caused to an individual by the existence of any records must be
weighed against the utility to the Government of their maintenance." Paton
v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 868 (3d Cir. 1975). See also Chastain v. Kelley, 510
F.2d 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (personnel file); United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925
(10th Cir. 1975); Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Tarlton v.
Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973); Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C.
Cir. 1970). Some of the factors the courts consider in the balance are:
the accuracy and adverse nature of the information, the availability
and scope of dissemination of the records, the legality of the methods
by which the information was compiled, the existence of statutes authorizing the compilation and maintenance, and prohibiting the destruction, of the recoreds [sic], and the values of the records to the
Government.
Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d at 869 (footnote omitted).
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sequences to the individual, then the records involved may properly be expunged." 99 The government argued that the individual's
right of privacy was outweighed by the public's interest in maintaining his criminal record. The court rejected the argument,
pointing out the tremendous burden a record could have on an individual's reputation and economic opportunities:
Even if no direct economic loss is involved, the injury to an individual's
reputation may be substantial. Economic losses themselves may be both
direct and serious. Opportunities for schooling, employment, or professional licenses may be restricted or nonexistent as a consequence of the
mere fact of an arrest, even if followed by acquittal or complete exoneration of the charges involved. An arrest record may be used by the police in
determining whether subsequently to arrest the individual concerned, or
whether to exercise their discretion to bring formal charges against an individual already arrested.100

Similarly, in Sullivan v. Murphy'' a case involving large scale
arrests of anti-war demonstrators, the court stated that it possessed the authority to order the expungement of all records
where "necessary and appropriate in order to preserve basic legal
rights.' 02 Having established its authority to order expungement,
the court surprisingly left to the trial court the decision of what
specific relief should be granted. However, it noted that maintenance and dissemination of the records should be limited since
"the very presence of these records carries the strong implication
that the
underlying arrest and detention were somehow justi03
fied."'
Thus, under well-established common law principle, ° 4 it appears that a federal court has the inherent power to order expungement; but the power is not frequently exercised and whether
expungement will be ordered depends on the circumstances of
each case. There is "no definitive, all-purpose rule to govern requests of this nature, and to a considerable degree each case must
05
stand on its own two feet.'
Sullivan, however, also illustrates a type of case which almost
always gives rise to an order of expungement-the mass arrest.
Although there are no hard-fast rules in this area it does appear
that in cases of large scale arrests of blacks, 06 hippies 107 and anti99. 53 F.R.D. at 214.
100. Id. at 214-15 (footnotes omitted).
101. 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973). See notes 53-63 &
accompanying text supra.
102. 478 F.2d at 968.
103. Id. at 969 (footnote omitted).
104. See text accompanying note 102 supra. See also note 147 infra.
105. United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925, 927 (10th Cir. 1975).
106. United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967). See notes 68-69 &accompanying text supra.
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war protestors' 0 8 requests for expungement have been uniformly
granted. The rationale the courts have used has been varied.
Some seem to suggest that the circumstances were so extraordinary that justice required an order of expungement. 109 Others reason that the arrests were presumptively illegal-due to the large
number it was impossible to determine the validity of the arrests
and because of departure from normal procedure probable cause
was often established after the arrest. Therefore, expungement
would be granted unless the validity of the arrest could be demonstrated by the government. 110 In any event, if an individual is the
victim of a mass arrest it would appear that his or her chances of
receiving expungement relief are quite good. However, the courts
seem to distinguish between arrests where members of a group
are harassed and cases involving a single arrestee. 11 1
In Menard v. Saxbe,1 12 for example, a student was erroneously
detained on suspicion of burglary. He was later released with no
charges filed against him but the incident had generated records
which Menard sought to have expunged. Initially the trial court
had granted summary judgment for the government but the court
of appeals reversed and remanded, stating that whether the
records could be maintained would depend upon a factual determination of whether there had been probable cause for the arrest." 3
On remand, the district court found that there had been sufficient
probable cause to justify the arrest and thus refused to expunge
Menard's records."14 Further, it questioned the utility of using a
probable cause test as a basis for granting expungement, stating
that such a determination "has little to do with the merits of the
underlying controversy."' 1 5 On appeal, however, the district court
107. Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated on other
grounds,401 U.S. 987 (1971); Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
See notes 64-66 & accompanying text supra.
108. Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973).
See notes 53-63 & accompanying text supra.
109. Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
110. Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973).
111. See Comment, supra note 3, at 1472. The basis for the distinction might be
that it is easier to find that a group has been harassed than an individual. A
large scale arrest of hippies, for example, is more "extraordinary" than the
arrest of one hippie, even though in both situations the arrests might have
been for purposes of harrassment. Note also that in the mass arrest cases the
invalidity of the arrests was presumed, see note 60 & accompanying text
supra, but under the Menard test, see note 113 & accompanying text infra,
the court must find that the arrest was made without probable cause before it
can grant a request for expungement.
112. 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See notes 72-79 & accompanying text supra.
113. Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 492-95 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
114. Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 723 (D.D.C. 1971).
115. Id. at 724. Two District of Columbia Court of Appeals cases have followed the
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was again reversed. Although not granting full expungement, the
circuit court did order a transfer of Menard's records from the
criminal to the neutral index and suggested Menard maintain an
action against the local agencies."16 Thus, after nine years of litigation Dale Menard was still left with a record"17 although it was no
longer considered "criminal." The case aptly demonstrates the reluctance of the courts to grant expungement relief to a single arrestee when alternatives such as restricting dissemination or
8
correcting inaccuracies are available."Two other federal courts have taken an even narrower position.
In United States v. Rosen"19 corporate and individual defendants
had been charged with numerous counts of unlawful importation
and receipt of Asiatic human hair wigs. All defendants were acquitted in one of two indictments and charges against the individual defendants in the other indictment were dismissed. The court
denied defendant's motion for return of photographs, fingerprints
and arrest records, reaching this conclusion through "balancing
equities.' 20 It was explained that a "dismissal does not necessarily go to a consideration of the merits"' 2' and in cases of acquittal
arrest was illegal or a statthe records could be retained unless the
22
ute directed the return of the record.
A similarly restrictive view was taken in United States v.
Linn, 23 in which an attorney was acquitted of charges of mail
fraud and conspiracy. He sought expungement, alleging damage to
his professional reputation and an invasion of his right to privacy.
The court refused to order expungement and stated that relief
"should be reserved for the unusual or extreme case .... [A] n acquittal, standing alone, is not in itself sufficient to warrant an expunction of an arrest record."' 24
Thus, from the federal courts there emerges two basic tests for

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

121.
122.
123.
124.

Menard probable cause test but refused to order expungement or sealing of
the records. See District of Columbia v. Sophia, 306 A.2d 652, 654 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1973) and Spock v. District of Columbia, 283 A.2d 14, 19 (D. C. Ct. App.
1971) (proper remedy would be to order correction of the records and then
only if petitioner could show non-culpability and "not mere exoneration").
Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
See Caine, supra note 2, at 1184-85 and n.18.
See also note 115 supra.
343 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
The court found that society's interest in effective law enforcement outweighed the individual's right to privacy, especially since there had been no
allegation of harrassment, improper use of the records, or economic injury.
Id. at 808 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 806.
Id. at 808.
51aF.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 927-28.
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determining when expungement is appropriate: the probable
cause test and the balancing of equities test. The application of
these tests varies greatly. Some courts give great weight to the individual's interest in privacy, whereas others take a narrower view
that there must be extraordinary circumstances, i.e., an invasion of
privacy plus some other threatened injury.125 Similar diversity in
application of these tests has also appeared in several state courts.
2. State Courts
Of the state courts addressing the criminal record problem,
only a few have relied upon a right of privacy theory to grant expungement relief. In Davidson v. Dill1 26 the plaintiff, who had
been charged with loitering but was subsequently acquitted, requested either the return or destruction of her records. The Colorado Supreme Court balanced the individual's right to privacy
against society's interest in retaining records of acquitted defendants, recognizing the potential personal and economic harm which
result from the dissemination of arrest records. In reversing the
dismissal of plaintiff's claim, the court made clear that plaintiff's
action did state a claim upon which relief could be granted: "The
complaint presents an extremely important issue ... involving a
constitutional right of the highest magnitude-an individual's right
to privacy vis-a-vis the propriety of the police retaining that perin police files after he had been acquitted of
son's arrest records
127
criminal conduct."'
Similar reasoning was utilized by the Washington Court of Appeals in Eddy v. Moore1 28 where the rights involved were recognized as fundamental. 129 Petitioner requested the return of
photographs and fingerprints after charges of assault had been dismissed. The court agreed that disadvantages flow from criminal
130
It
records: one problem being an increase in police scrutiny.
125. Comment, supra note 3, at 1476.
126. 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 (1972). See also Note, Davidson v. Dill: A Compelling State Interest in RetainingArrest Records, 35 U. Prrr. L REV. 205 (1973).
127. 180 Colo. at 132, 503 P.2d at 162.
128. 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971).
129. See also State v. Pinkney, 33 Ohio Misc. 183, 184, 290 N.E.2d 923, 924 (Ct. C.P.
1972) ("there exists in the individual a fundamental right of privacy").
130. The court stated:
An individual who has been arrested and then acquitted has an
undeniable greater visibility to the police than other persons. His
fingerprints, and more particularly his photograph, are available to
be shown to other citizens as a potential suspect to be chosen in
prearrest lineups, an identification procedure frequently used by law
enforcement agencies. Increased police scrutiny resulting from an
arrest record and its potential invasion of the individual's private life,
if it occurs, should rest upon rational factors.
5 Wash. App. at 344, 487 P.2d at 216.
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was observed that once an arrestee has been acquitted of criminal
charges there remains no rational basis for the record to be retained, especially in light of the fundamental principle that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty.131 The court held
that the fingerprints and photographs should be ordered returned
and stated:
We believe the right of an individual, absent a compelling showing of
necessity by the government, to the return of his fingerprints and photographs, upon an acquittal, is a fundamental right implicit in the concept of
the penumbras of the specific
ordered liberty and that it is as well within
32
guarantees of the Bill of Rights .... 1

However, a majority of courts have rejected the argument that
record expungement should be compelled under a privacy theory.133 For example, in Loder v. Municipal Court,134 Loder attacked a police officer who was beating his wife and was arrested
for battery, obstructing a police officer and disturbing the peace.
The complaint against Loder was dismissed and the officer was
temporarily suspended from duty for the incident. Loder sought
an order compelling the return or erasure of his arrest records.
The court reiterated an earlier position 135 that judicial intervention
was unwarranted and held that the trial court properly denied the
relief requested. 136 It was noted that no statutory authority existed which would require erasure or return of arrest records. Further the court recognized the multiple uses of such records
throughout the criminal justice system as constituting a substan131. For a discussion of the relationship between the presumption of innocence
and expungement, see Comment, supra note 35, at 668-70.
132. 5 Wash. App. at 345, 487 P.2d at 214 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484 (1965)).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1975); Herschel v. Dyra,
365 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Seasholtz, 376 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D.
Okla. 1974); United States v. Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1973); United
States v. Rosen, 343 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Beasley v. Glenn, 110 Ariz.
438, 520 P.2d 310 (1974); Walker v. Lamb, 254 A.2d 265, (Del. Ch.), affd per
curiam, 259 A.2d 663 (Del. 1969); Spock v. District of Columbia, 283 A.2d 14
(D.C. Ct. App. 1971); Purdy v. Mulkey, 228 So. 2d 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969);
People v. Lewerenz, 42 11. App. 2d 410, 192 N.E.2d 401 (1963); In re Raynor, 123
N.J. Super. 526, 303 A.2d 896 (1973); In re Foster, 72 Misc. 2d 1029, 340 N.Y.S.2d
758 (County Ct. 1973); Statman v. Kelley, 47 Misc. 2d 294, 262 N.Y.S.2d 799
(Sup. Ct.), affd. per curiam, 24 A.D.2d 936, 264 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1965); State v.
Bellar, 16 N.C. App. 339, 192 S.E.2d 86 (1972). See also Comment, Retention
and Dissemination of Arrest Records: JudicialResponse, 38 y. CHL L, REv.
850, 858-59 (1971).
134. 17 Cal. 3d 859, 553 P.2d 624, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1976).
135. Sterling v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App. 2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962). See
also note 14 supra.
136. 17 Cal. 3d at 876, 553 P.2d at 636, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
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tial governmental interest. 137 When balanced against the individual right of privacy
the court found the government's interest to be
13 8
weightier.
Additionally, the court cited Paulv. Davis139 for the proposition
that, "[t] here is apparently no right of privacy in arrest records
under the federal Constitution."' 40 In that case Davis brought an
action under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act141 alleging deprivation of his constitutional rights. He had been arrested for shoplifting and his name and "mug shot" had appeared on a flyer of
"active shoplifters" which was distributed to approximately 800
merchants. Shortly after circulation of the flyer the shoplifting
charge was dismissed. Davis alleged that distribution of the flyer
caused injury to his reputation and therefore deprived him of liberty and property without due process. He also alleged an invasion of his right to privacy. On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed
with the district court's dismissal for the reason that the alleged
facts did not establish deprivation of a constitutional right. The
Court held that any harm to Davis' reputation did not deprive him
of any "liberty" or "property" interest protected by the due process clause. 142 As to Davis' privacy claim the Court declined to enlarge its prior "substantive privacy decisions"' 43 and thus
concluded that there had been no invasion of a constitutionally
recognized right.144
Paul v. Davis further complicates the question of what weight
the individual's right to privacy should be given in the balancing of
equities test. If the holding of the case is construed broadly then it
seems clear it could be relied upon to deny requests for expungement. However, one commentator has suggested that "Paulv. Davis does not require a departure from cases permitting
expungement.' 45 The contention is that there are significant dif137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 864-68, 553 P.2d at 628-30, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 468-70.
Id. at 868-69, 553 P.2d at 630-31, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 470-71.
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
17 Cal. 3d at 877 n.24, 553 P.2d at 637 n.24, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 477 n.24.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
424 U.S. at 712.
E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (guarantee of personal privacy limited
to matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception and family relationships).
144. 424 U.S. at 712-13.
145. Comment, supra note 3, at 1477 (emphasis in original). Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 735 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Court's holding might end the
notion of privacy as a basis for arrest record expungement):
A host of state and federal courts, relying on both privacy notions
and the presumption of innocence, have begun to develop a line of
cases holding that there are substantive limits on the power of the
Government to disseminate unresolved arrest records outside the
law enforcement system .... I fear that after today's decision,
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ferences between Paul v. Davis and the expungement cases which
can serve as a basis for distinction. One difference is in the "nature of the relief sought"'4 6-Davis sought both damages and injunctive relief, a remedy which could have been pursued through a
claim for defamation under state law. x4 7 A second difference and
"a more critical distinction... is the nature of the individual interest in privacy asserted by Davis."' 48 Davis was seeking protection
from invasion of his privacy during a time when charges against
him had not yet been dismissed. 149 Even those cases granting expungement under a privacy theory gave no recognition to the right

146.
147.

148.
149.

these nascent doctrines will never have the opportunity for full
growth and analysis. Since the Court of Appeals did not address respondent's privacy claims, and since there has not been substantial
briefing or oral argument on that point, the Court's pronouncements
are certainly unnecessary. Of course, States that are most sensitive
than is this Court to the privacy and other interests of individuals
erroneously caught up in the criminal justice system are certainly
free to adopt or adhere to higher standards under state law.
Id. at n.18.
Comment, supra note 3, at 1477.
424 U.S. at 697. Not only might there be a claim for defamation but also the
tort of invasion of privacy might be available. See generally Comment, supra
note 5, at 879-80 & nn.77-82.
There is a recurring tendency by the Court to avoid expanding section
1983 liability. See, e.g., Note, Section 1983: LiabilityforNegligence, 58 NEB. L.
REv. 271 (1979). Thus, the underlying message of Paul v. Davis would seem
to be that claims like those of Mr. Davis should be pursued under state tort
law and not in the federal courts. Whether this means an end to equitable
expungement relief is not clear. See note 145 supra.
Comment, supra note 3, at 1477.
See United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967), in which the court
distinguished between the privacy rights of an individual before and after
exoneration and concluded that after an individual is exonerated, his or her
right to privacy is not outweighed by a legitimate governmental interest:
There can be no denying of the efficacy of fingerprint information,
photographs, and other means of identification in the apprehension
of criminals and fugitives. Law enforcement agencies must utilize all
scientific data in society's never-ending battle against lawlessness
and crime. When arrested,an accused does not have a constitutional
right of priacy that outweighs the necessity of protecting society and
the accumulation of this data, no matter how mistaken the arrest
may have been.
However, when an accused is acquittedof the crime or when he is
discharged without conviction, no public good is accomplished by the
retention of criminal identification records. On the other hand, a
great imposition is placed upon the citizen. His privacy and personal
dignity is invaded as long as the Justice Department retains "criminal" identification records, "criminal" arrest, fingerprints and a
rogue's gallery photograph. ...

. .
h e preservation of these records constitutes an unwarranted attack upon his character and reputation and.., violates his
dignity as a human being.
Id. at 970 (emphasis added).
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of privacy "priorto final dismissal of charges underlying an arrest,
and dissemination of arrest information in this pre-exoneration period would not be precluded."'150
Thus, it does not appear that the right of privacy or interest in
reputation rise to a constitutionally-protected level so as to be
deemed fundamental rights as some of the earlier cases suggest. 151
Yet the rationale of those cases need not be abandoned. In balancing the equities between an individual's interest in privacy and the
government's interest in retention, courts can still be sympathetic
to the hardships and disabilities attendant to a criminal record. A
distinction could be made between the privacy rights of an individual before and after exoneration 15 2 and Paul v. Davis can be limited to its particular facts. Although perhaps not entitled to the
weight of fundamental rights, the individual's interest in reputation and privacy can clearly outweigh any governmental interest in
15 3
retention of the records.
B.

The Legislative Response

Although the courts have equitable power to order expungement, in a number of cases the view has been expressed that the
legislature was the proper body to make such a remedy available.M Thus, the criminal record problem has seen the attention
of Congress 155 as well as state legislative bodies.
150. Comment, supra note 3, at 1477 (emphasis in original).
151. See notes 126-32 & accompanying text supra.
152. "However, it is obvious that to recognize the privacy interest of all exonerated defendants as being constitutionally protected would have dramatic
ramifications and pose serious problems in the context of existing law enforcement practices and record dissemination procedures." Comment supra
note 3, at 1493.
153. If fundamental rights are not involved, the government would not be required
to show a compelling state interest. But the courts could still use a balancing
approach or a rational basis test, finding in favor of the individual when no
legitimate state interest was at stake. See Comment, supra note 133, at 858-59
nn.48-49; text accompanying note 131 supra.
154. See, e.g., United States v. Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1973). But see
People v. Chapman, 62 Cal. App. 3d 251, 132 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1976) (implying
that legislative provision for destruction of arrest records might be unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine).
155. See, e.g., I-1I 61/S. 1428 and ELR 62/S. 1427, S. 2008 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975); H.R. 12574, H-R. 12575/S. 2963 and S. 4252 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974);
H.R. 10789, H.R. 10892 and S. 2964 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
See also Criminal Justice Data Banks-1974, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary,92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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FederalRemedies

There is no specific federal statute providing for expungement
of criminal records. However, there is a somewhat limited provision for record cancellation, which is seldom used and has been
criticized as inadequate. 156 The major concern at the federal level
has been with preventing disclosure of FBI records which contain
inaccurate or incomplete information. Under federal regulations,157 there are no limits on the dissemination of conviction
data' 58 and nonconviction data 15 9 cannot be disseminated, with
certain exceptions. 160 Each state is free to make provisions in its
own best interests. 161 Although these regulations give the individual a limited amount of protection, they are inadequate in many
respects: 62 (1) they do not affect dissemination of the record to
law enforcement agencies or agencies of the federal government;
(2) they only reach records in the files of the FBI and do not di156. 28 U.S.C. § 534(b) (1976). See note 94 supra.
157. The regulations were issued by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) pursuant to a statutory amendment to its enabling legislation.
The amendment, which was enacted into law as section 524(b) of the Crime
Control Act of 1973, states:
All criminal history information collected, stored, or disseminated
through support under this title shall contain, to the maximum extent feasible, disposition as well as arrest data where arrest data is
included therein. The collection, storage, and dissemination of such
information shall take place under procedures reasonably designed
to insure that all such information is kept current therein; the Administration shall assure that the security and privacy of all information is adequately provided for and that information shall only be
used for law enforcement and criminal justice and other lawful purposes. In addition, an individual who believes that criminal history
information concerning him contained in an automated system is inaccurate, incomplete, or maintained in violation of this title, shall,
upon satisfactory verification of his identity, be entitled to review
such information and to obtain a copy of it for the purpose of challenge or correction.
Crime Control Act of 1973, Pub.L. No. 93-83, 87 Stat. 197 (amending 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3701-3795 (1970)).
158. But see the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
159.
"Nonconviction data" means arrest information without disposition if an interval of one year has elapsed from the date of arrest and
no active prosecution of the charge is pending; or information disclosing that the police have elected not to refer a matter to a prosecutor, or that a prosecutor has elected not to commence criminal
proceedings, or that proceedings have been indefinitely postponed,
as well as all acquittals and all dismissals.
28 C.F.R. § 20.3(k) (1977).
160. 41 Fed. Reg. 11,714 (1976) (revising 28 C.F.R. § 20.21(b)).
161. 28 C.F.R. § 20.21(c) (3) (1977).
162. "These provisions do not at the present time provide the national framework
necessary to limit dissemination of records." Madden & Lessin, Privacy: A
Casefor Accurate and Complete CriminalHistory Records, 22 Vnz. L REV.
1191, 1197 (1977).
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rectly affect records made at the local level; and (3) they do not
provide for the return or destruction of the records. Therefore,
whether relief at the local level is available through state expungement or sealing laws becomes extremely important.
2. Remedies Provided by State Law
In response to the growing concern over the misuse and abuse
of arrest records several state legislatures have enacted protective
legislation usually in the form of prohibiting access to criminal justice information or requiring destruction of arrest records once the
arrestee has been exonerated. 63 Although the laws are in accord
as to purpose, a variety of approaches has been taken: some give
relief automatically, some provide for expungement, others allow
for sealing of records, and still others leave the decision to the discretion of the courts.
For example, in Missouri a person's arrest record must be
sealed to all persons except the arrestee if he or she is not charged
within thirty days of arrest.1 64 The statute also provides that if the
person is not convicted within one year after the records are
sealed, all records of the arrest must be expunged. 65 In the event
of a disposition other than conviction (nolle prosses, dismissals,
acquittals) the records pertaining to the case are to be sealed to all
66
persons except the arrestee.
Another state which provides for automatic relief is Connecticut, whose law mandates that all court, police and prosecutorial
records be erased immediately once an arrestee has been acquitted or discharged. 67 The records are sealed in locked ifies or destroyed upon request. Notice of erasure is sent to any agency
68
known to have received the arrest information.
In other states the exonerated arrestee must petititon for relief.
For instance, in Maryland a person seeking expungement must
give notice to the law enforcement agency involved who then in163. For a survey of state laws, see Comment, CriminalProcedure: Expunging the
Arrest Record When There Is No Conviction, 28 OKLA. L REV. 377, 386-87
(1975); Comment, Epungement in California: Legislative Neglect and Judicial Abuse of the Statutory Mitigationof Felony Convictions, 12 U.S.F. L. REV.
155, 172-78 (1977).
164. Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.100 (Supp. 1973).
165. Id.
166. Id. § 610.105.
167. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-142a (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
168. The statute has been criticized as leaving "untouched and in place all of the
other information about the individual which has accumulated in the course
of a criminal proceeding." Weinstein, Confidentiality of Criminal Records
Privacy v. the Public Interest, 22 Vii. L. REV. 1205, 1210 (1977).
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vestigates the request. 1 69 If the individual is denied relief he or
she may petition for a judicial hearing. Similarly, Nevada law allows record sealing upon petition of the arrestee filed thirty days
after dismissal or acquittal. 170 There is a hearing on the issue following which the court may order the records sealed.
A different approach is taken in Arizona where a person
"wrongfully arrested" can seek a court order restricting dissemination of police and court records. 171 The arrestee must petition the
court for relief and after a hearing on the petitition the court must
decide whether "justice will be served" by entry of a notation that
the person was arrested in error.172 If the court orders such entry,
no copies of the record may be released without a court order.
California presents yet another approach by having a "scattered patchwork" of expungement statutes. One provision relieves
173
Another
the disabilities attendant to certain felony convictions.
provides relief to persons convicted of a misdemeanor and not
granted probation, 174 whereas a second procedure is a sealing statute for minors. 7 5 Four provisions are aimed at relieving the effects
of conviction on narcotics users and juveniles, 176 and there is a provision for expungement of records of arrest or conviction for possession or use of small amounts of marijuana. 177 Record sealing is
by the judge that the defendprovided upon acquittal and a17finding
8
ant was "factually innocent."'
Under certain circumstances and passage of a substantial period of time New Jersey law also provides for expungement of conviction records. 179 An innocent arrestee is afforded either the
remedy of expungement or sealing, but objection to a motion for
80
relief automatically precludes expungement
Yet there are other states, such as Nebraska, which afford no
real relief for the innocent arrestee and few states provide relief
for an ex-offender. In light of judicial reluctance to grant expunge169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

MD.ANN. CODE art. 27, § 736 (1976).
NEV. REv. STAT. § 179.255 (1973).
AnRz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13-4051 (Supp. 1978).
See Beasley v. Glenn, 110 Ariz. 438, 520 P.2d 310 (1974), in which the court held
that the statute did not provide for expungement but only a notation restricting dissemination.
CAL.PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West Supp. 1979).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4a (West Supp. 1979).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.45 (West Supp. 1979).
CAL. WELF.& INST. CODE §§ 3200, 781, 1179, 1772 (West Supp. 1979).
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11361.5 (West Supp. 1979).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8 (West Supp. 1979).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:169-11, 2A.164-28 (West 1971) (repealed 1978, effective
Sept. 1, 1979).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:85-17, 2A.85-18 (West Supp. 1979-1980) (repealed 1978,
effective Sept. 1, 1979).
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ment unless there are "extraordinary circumstances," the absence
of protective legislation contributes to the burden on the victim of
a criminal record. As Aryeh Neier, Executive Director of the
American Civil Liberties Union has stated:
[A] rrest and conviction records often create social lepers who must exist
as best they can on the fringes of society. The dissemination of records
places a series of obstacles in the path of persons who wish to enter society's mainstream and end the half-life of the world of crime. Is it any wonder, then, that recidivism rates should be so high? How can we seriously
hope to reduce crime if we disseminate records which have the unintended effect of making it impossible for people to stop being
criminals? 1 8 1

Thus, it is essential to take a closer look at what remedies most
adequately solve the problem. Given the overwhelming evidence
of the use and reliance upon criminal records 182 it must be agreed
that a problem exists. The apparent disagreement among commentators, the courts and legislative bodies has been over whether
the problem is so serious that it warrants legislative relief and if so
whether sealing and expungement are effective remedies.
IV. ARE EXPUNGEMENT AND RECORD SEALING
SATISFACTORY SOLUTIONS?
A.

Shortcomings of Sealing and Expungement Statutes
It has been suggested that provisions for sealing or expunging
criminal records are a failure; 183 that they are inadequate at removing the disabilities that accompany criminal records 184 and
that they are of questionable constitutional validity. 185 These and
a number of other arguments have been made to justify the retention of criminal records and denying expungement relief.
1. A System Which Purportsto Destroy Records Does not
Work
Some commentators have argued that "expungement in the
sense of an erasure or destruction [is] impractical as well as inadvisable."'18 6 They argue that once a record is created it is simply
not possible to expunge or seal it. This is the case primarily because statutes or court orders requiring expungement, generally
181.

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Hearingson S. 2008 Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 235 (1975) (statement of
Aryeh Neier, Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union).
See § II of text supra.
Kogon & Loughery, supra note 9.
Id. at 384.
Comment, supra note 3, at 1469-70.
Expungementfrom the GeneralPublic, supra note 9.
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do not reach all copies of the record which might have been dis187
seminated to various public agencies and private individuals.
The problem seems to be that
in the absence of any penal sanctions against disclosure, the accessibility
of such records is generally a matter of whom one knows in the department in which they are kept. Disclosure is further pyramided by the
many places to which such records are distributed
and thus additional
188
sources from which they may be procured.

Specifically, it is argued that state expungement or sealing statutes
cannot affect FBI records and do not affect local police records. In
addition, legislation typically leaves room for employers to inquire
about an applicant's possible expunged or sealed record. 189 Finally, "the written order for records to be sealed or destroyed is
itself not concealed; this, of course, creates a 'track' to be followed."1 9 0 Because so many traces of a record may be left behind,
the contention is that expungement and sealing simply do not
work.191
Another argument which is frequently made is that history
should not be rewritten' 92 and that attempts to do so may lead to
"institutionalizing a lie.' 9 3 One court has stated that an arrest is a
"historical fact" and therefore
[n] o system of law can, with integrity, lend or appear to lend its aid to an
unreal denial of the events, particularly as such denials may affect the
lawful judgment of other persons who may in the future deal with them. It
is one thing to say that the system of law will legally ignore an acknowledged fact and perhaps, pursuant to specific legislation, indulge in a fiction
that what was once a conviction or a criminal charge shall no longer be
187. Kogon & Loughery, supra note 9, at 384. 'That which is sealed may readily
become unsealed ....
" Id.
188. Expungementfrom the General Public, supra note 9.
189. For example, an applicant might be asked whether he or she had ever had a
criminal record sealed, Kogon & Loughery, supra note 9, at 384, or whether he
or she had ever appeared as a moving party in any court, Gough, supra note
12, at 164-65 n.80.
190. Kogon & Loughery, supra note 9, at 384.
191. Id. at 383-84. "[K]nowledge of an expunged record is available if the prints
have been forwarded to the FBI ....
[T] he person develops a false sense of
security and anonymity regarding the record that certainly does not maintain
in practice." Id. at 387.
192.
The expungement, either by statute or judicial deccision, creates
new problems. It requires, in effect, that history be rewritten, that
events be turned into nonevents, and it attempts to achieve this
anomalous result by eliminating a part of the information which has
accumulated in the course of a criminal proceeding.
Weinstein, supra note 168, at 1210.
193.
In encouraging him to lie, the society communicates to him that his
former offender status is too degrading to acknowledge, and that it is
best forgotten or repressed, as if it had never existed at all. Such
self-delusion and hypocrisy is the very model of mental ill healththe reverse of everything correctional philosophy stands for.
Kogon & Loughery, supra note 9, at 385.
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deemed such; but it is quite another to assist in rewriting history at the
expense of truth, particularly where, as outlined above, the full truth if
can preserve the integrity of the individual as well as
effectively recorded
194
the rule of law.

It has also been suggested that expungement and sealing procedures are not available to all. The remedies are criticized as being
"functional only for a very small number of offenders who have
resources and can negotiate the system."' 95 Because granting relief is generally within the discretion of the court it may be that
even if ex-offenders had knowledge of the remedy they would not
apply for it anyway.
2. Law Enforcement Would Be Hampered If Records Were
Not Retained
A good deal of opposition to the sealing or expungement of
criminal justice information has come from law enforcement authorities. They cite the usefulness 196 of arrest records in solving
u9 7
cases and in saving "valuable investigative time and energy.'
The retention of arrest records has also been justified by the potential such records have for helping police prevent crimes.
One commentator suggests that identification information such
as fingerprints and photographs can be helpful to police "if the individual is ever under investigation again."' 98 The police are aided
by establishing positive identification or protecting a person who is
innocent. The information can also indicate a pattern of conduct
which could form the basis for a future arrest. Although it is acknowledged that injury to innocent persons may result, "this risk
is outweighed in most cases by society's interest in the performance of these activities to protect the general public."' 99
3. Sealing and Expungement Laws Unconstitutionally
Infringe Upon Freedom of the Press
It has been suggested that the sealing of criminal records could
be framed as a clash between two constitutional rights-the right
to privacy and freedom of the press-and that in the balance the
194. Spock v. District of Columbia, 283 A.2d 14, 21 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971) (footnote
omitted).
195. Kogon & Loughery, supra note 9, at 386.
196. One commentator has termed this the "usefulness doctrine." See note 198
infra.
197. CriminalJustice Data Banks-1974,HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong., 2d Sess. 199

(1974) (statement of Clarence M. Kelley, Director FBI declaring his opposition to sealing).
198. Comment, supra note 133, at 855. See also § II-A of text supra.

199. Id.
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right of privacy must yield.2 00 Relying on Paul v. Davis,20 1 COx
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,20 2 and Sheppard v. Maxwell,203 one
commentator contends that a state cannot make 204
criminal history
records private or deny the press access to them.
The right to gather news about judicial operations has only
been given limited constitutional protection, and thus "[t] he right
of access to classified, criminal justice records is as unclear as the
right to make them secret in the first place. '2 05 But "[w] hat transpires in the courtroom... is public property" and to make private the records of what transpired would prevent the press from
reporting on the administration of justice.20 6 Since the press has a
responsibility of scrutinizing the judicial process, "it would seem
that there is a corollary right of access to gather news about that
207
system."
Although the Supreme Court did not give constitutional recognition to the privacy right asserted in Paulv. Davis,20 8 it has generally avoided the question whether a state could make criminal
records private. It is maintained, however, that the Court's position concerning state action which infringes first amendment
rights supports the argument that record sealing is unconstitutional.209 When state action infringes upon first amendment rights
the state must show a compelling state interest in regulating the
subject, and that the objective could not be achieved by other
means. The argument is that the goal of sealing laws could be
achieved "without manipulating original source documents and
records traditionally open to public inspection ....-210 The commentator suggests remedies which might be less drastic: "Statu200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Comment, supra note 7, at 522-26.
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
420 U.S. 469 (1975).
384 U.S. 333 (1966).
Comment, supra note 7, at 526-27. With regard to this argument one commentator has noted:
The strongest advocates of open access are the news media.
While their interest is, in part, selfish-access to information, especially "inside" information, makes for good copy-they forcefully argue that elimination or concealment of information is an open
invitation to inadequate performance or illegal behavior. The press,
however, acknowledges few formal limits on its own access to publicly held information. Self-restraint and enlightened self-interest
are considered to be sufficient constraints on journalistic abuse of
information.
Weinstein, supra note 168, at 1212-13.
Comment, supra note 6, at 522.
Id. at 527.
Id. at 521.
See notes 143-44 & accompanying text supra.
Comment, supra note 7, at 527-28 & nn. 119-20.
Id. at 528.
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tory requirements that records be accurate and complete, that
employers and others be forbidden to ask for or consider the individual's non-conviction arrest record, and that the records themselves be open to correction by the individual .... -211
Thus, opponents of expungement say it creates new problems.
It requires that history be rewritten, it eliminates part of information the accused may need as evidence of innocence, and it makes
difficult the responsibility of uncovering a potential pattern of corruption in our system of justice. The argument is that a system of
concealment does not work,2 12 and even if it did there exist alternative remedies which provide more adequate solutions to the
problem.
B.

The Affirmative Side of Expungement and Sealing

Although sealing and expungement laws are not free from conceptual and practical difficulties, they do confer benefits upon
the
' 2 13
flowvictim of a criminal record. The "collateral consequences
ing from a conviction as well as an arrest record mandate that a
215
remedy be provided. Leading organizations, 214 commentators
211. Id. at 529 (footnotes omitted).
212. It has been suggested that
it is also not entirely clear that most people want [sealing or expungement] to work. The thrust of the solutions is the sacrifice of
some purported public benefit to gain some purported private benefit. If the private beneficiaries are actual or alleged criminals, and the
public beneficiaries are everyone else, then the perceived public benefit is quite likely to prevail. The general public sees little or no connection between collection and computerization of information about
"criminals" and its own "privacy" and related interests. The immediate problem of controlling criminal behavior precludes serious consideration of remote and uncertain consequences. If the computer
can be used to "fight crime," then the public is behind it.
Weinstein, supra note 168, at 1211-12.
213. See generally Collateral Consequences, supra note 10.
214. See, e.g., the American Civil Liberties Union position discussed in Caine,
supra note 2, at 1188. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.6 (1962) (providing limited relief for the removal of disabilities or disqualifications).
Rather than recommending expungement, the National Conference on
Uniform State Laws recommends that refusal to hire because of a conviction
record is an unfair employment practice except in situations which are narrowly defined and directly related to the offense; for example, where the occupation would provide an opportunity to commit a similar crime. UNIFORM
LAW COMMISSIONERS' MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF LAw ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAw ENFORCEMENT

ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE §§ 4-1001 to -1005 (1978).
See Perlman & Potuto, The Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Sentencing
and CorrectionsAct: An Overview, 58 NEB. L. REV. 925 (1979).
215. See generally note 9 supra.
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and several states 216 have recognized that the most effective remedy is to provide for sealing or expungement of the record.
1. The System Can Work
It is by no means well-accepted nor does it necessarily follow
that expungement and sealing do not work simply because some
evidence of the record is not sealed or destroyed. One state requires that notice be given any agency to which the arrest information is known to have been disseminated.2 17 In the absence of
statutes in their jurisdictions, some courts have fashioned relief by
having the local police retrieve all disseminated copies of the record and placed under seal, not to be opened nor their existence or
contents disclosed.2 1 8 Even if some information is "leaked" out,
statutes may prohibit inquiries into past arrests, 2 19 or allow the in-

dividual to deny the existence of the record with no threat of being
found guilty of giving a false statement. 220 Thus, although it might
be desirable to have complete destruction of the record, the fact
that this is not possible in all cases does not negate the potential
relief which can be afforded.
A system which "sanctions deceit" may make some legislators
uncomfortable. A study of employer attitudes revealed that it
troubled them also:
Several expressed distrust of an expungement procedure, and indicated
that they would not look favorably on someone who had invoked it. As
one man put it: "Weprobably wouldn't fire the guy outright [i.e., in the
be rather
event of subsequent discovery of the offense], but I think we'd
' 22 1
hurt that he didn't feel he could come and tell us about it.

But what is more bothersome is what happens to the exonerated
arrestee when he or she is totally candid with potential employers.
In Cissell v. Brostron,222 for example, charges against Cissell for
murder were dismissed. He made several attempts to secure employment and in one instance even supplemented the application
216. See § uI-B-2 supra.
217. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-142a (West Supp. 1979). See notes 167-68 and accompanying text supra.
218. See, e.g., Irani v. District of Columbia, 272 A.2d 849 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971), appealfrom final order dismissed, 292 A.2d 804 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972).
219. Similarly, inquiries into "old" convictions could be limited, i.e., whether there
had been any convictions within the last seven years. The government formerly asked for information concerning all arrests but now asks only for arrests that led to a conviction. THE CHALLENGE OF CIME, supra note 4, at 75,
cited in Comment, supra note 37, at 132 n.63.
220. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 610.110 (Supp. 1973). See also Comment,
supra note 5, at 873 n.38; Comment, supra note 37, at 125.
221. Gough, supra note 12, at 154 n.39.
222. 395 S.W.2d 322 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
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with a detective magazine story written about him which explained the details of his arrest. He received no response from that
employer. Following several more unsuccessful applications, he
sought and obtained an expungement order. 223 On appeal the order was reversed, the court holding that injunctive relief was available only in situations where actual injury could be shown and was
limited to restraining actual or threatened acts. 224 The "system,"
therefore, already sanctions deceit and perhaps even encourages
it.
Finally, the system is readily available to all ex-arrestees in
those states which provide for automatic sealing.225 Even in those
states where a petition is required the individual can be assured of
having as equal an access to the remedy as does any other individual.
2. Effective Law Enforcement Would Not Be Affected
It has been suggested that arrest or conviction records play a
vital role in effective law enforcement. 2 26 Where the modus operandi of a crime is sufficiently similar to that in a suspect's record
there might be probable cause for an arrest.227 Several factors are
important here: (1) a valid arrest is more likely if the actual crime
and the record of crime are not separated by too long a period of
time;22 (2) the reliance upon criminal records is justified if they
reflect a modus operandi similar to the activity in question; and (3)
the validity of the practice depends on the accuracy and complete229
ness of the records.
In the case of an exonerated arrestee there would appear to be
no rational basis for retaining the record. 230 Indeed one court has
stated that there is no legitimate government interest in retaining
records of arrests not resulting in conviction: "Unresolved arrest
records generally may well have significance for law enforcement
purposes.... But charges resulting in acquittal clearly have no
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 323-24.
Id. at 325-26.
See notes 164-68 & accompanying text supra.
See notes 196-99 & accompanying text supra.
W. LAFAVE, ARREST 288 (F. Remington ed. 1965). The author states: "The
difficult question is whether arrest can ever be proper when the primary basis for suspicion is the prior record of the suspect. A person's past record
does not in itself constitute reasonable grounds to believe that a felony has
been committed and that the person has committed it." Id. at 287. See also
note 20 supra.
228. See Gough, supra note 12, at 159.
229. See generally Comment, supra note 5, at 866.
230. Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 344, 487 P.2d 211, 216 (1971); see text accompanying note 131 supra; Comment, supra note 133, at 858-59 nn.48-49 (no legitimate state interest in retention of records of one mistakenly arrested).
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legitimate significance. Likewise, other charges which the government fails or refuses to press or which it withdraws are entitled to
no greater legitimacy." 231 Additionally, it has been estimated that
of the criminal histories received by state and local agencies, about
thirty-five percent do not contain dispositions. 232 Indeed if the
records are not accurate and complete how can they be effective to
law enforcement agencies, when the only information they provide
is the mere fact of arrest? One suggestion is that "[e]ven if the
record is only one of arrest and not conviction, criminal justice
agencies as well
as others tend to treat the two types of records as
233
equivalent."
The factor of time would seem to favor the ex-offender. The
greater the period of time between his or her offense and a recent,
unsolved crime, the less valid would be an arrest based on the record.234 In other words, once a period of several years has passed,
for example, five
to seven, and the ex-offender has maintained a
"clean" record 235 there is little likelihood of reasonable cause for
making an arrest based on a modus operandi of a crime "sufficiently similar to that described in a suspect's record .... ",236
231. United States v. Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75,77 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (emphasis added).
232. See A. MILLER, THE AssAuLT ON PRIVACY 34 (1971) (35% of FBI "rap sheets"
contain no followup information); Madden & Lessin, supra note 162, at 1198
(citing The American CriminalHistory Record Present Status and FutureRequirements, Technical Report No. 14, SEARCH Group, Inc., Sacramento, Cal.
(1976)) ("In 1975 approximately sixty-eight million requests were made for
criminal histories by state and local level criminal justice agencies. Of the
criminal histories received 31% had missing data and 10%, it was estimated,
had erroneous information."); Comment, supra note 7, at 512 n.16 (citing
CriminalJustice Data Banks-1974: Hearingson S. 2542, S. 2810, S. 2963, and
S. 2964 Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary,93d Cong., 2d Sess. Vol. I. at 37-38 (1974)) ("In several states, as
many as 70% of the records do not contain dispositions.").
233. Weinstein, supra note 168, at 1207.
234. See note 228 & accompanying text supra.
235. In New Jersey, "the statutes recognize that an old record loses its probative
value as indicia of a pattern demonstrative of criminal behavior." Comment,
supra note 5, at 888. Under the disorderly persons expungement statute the
individual must wait five years before seeking relief, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:16911 (West 1971) (repealed, 1978, effective Sept. 1, 1979), and under the criminal
expungement statute the waiting period is ten years, id. § 2A-164-28 (repealed
1978, effective Sept. 1, 1979).
Cf. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (5) (1976) (prohibiting
reporting of arrest or conviction information older than seven years); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1203.4a (West Supp. 1979) (to obtain relief, person convicted of
a misdemeanor must lead an honest and upright life, must not be charged
with the commission of any other crime, and must not have served a criminal
sentence for a one year period running from the date of conviction); OHio
REv. CODE ANN. § 2953.32 (Page Supp. 1978) (first offender felons may petition
for expungement of the conviction record three years after final discharge).
236. Comment, supra note 5, at 866.
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All of these considerations have led one commentator to state:
Nor is there any proof that the pervasive recording and dissemination
of arrest records has any effect in fighting crime. In various hearings on
legislation on arrest records neither the FBI nor any other law enforcement agency has presented a case that arrest records are essential in combating crime. It is more likely that the wide dissemination
of arrest
23 7
records has helped to create criminals, not the opposite.

3. Sealing and Expungement Do Not Infringe On Any
Constitutionally-ProtectedRights
There do not appear to be any reported cases which have
de238
It
cided the constitutionality of sealing or expungement laws.
has been urged that a sealing law results in "a collision between
criminal record privacy and the people's right to know."239 But it
can be argued that sealing and expungement laws do not have the
effect of abridging first amendment protections primarily 240
because
the press does not have an absolute right to gather news.
The press has no greater access to information than does the
public.2A1 If a state denies access to certain criminal records by
sealing or expunging, the law applies to everyone, members of the
press and public alike. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,24 2 held
only that the state could not impose sanctions on the press for
publishing information obtainable from public records. 243 It specifically left open the question whether a state could make such
records private:
If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the
States must respond by means which avoid public documentation or other
exposure of private information. Their political institutions must weigh
the interests in privacy with the interests of the public to know and of the
press to publish. 2 4 4
237. Caine, supra note 2, at 1189-90.
238. But see Gannett Pac. Corp. v. State, Civil No. 42343 (Hawaii 1st Cir. Ct., June
20, 1974), cited in Comment, supra note 7, at 517 n.39 (preliminary injunction
issued against enforcement of Hawaii law that sealed all information concerning an arrest from the moment of the arrest).
239. Comment, supra note 7, at 517.
240. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
241. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972).
242. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
243. Id. at 496. "Cox makes clear the difference between trying to prevent the
press from gathering the information in the first place, and trying to prevent
the publication of something that has been learned-especially from a public
record." M. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAw 384 n.8
(1977).
244. 420 U.S. at 496. "We mean to imply nothing about any constitutional questions which might arise from a state policy not allowing access by the public
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The state cannot tell the press what to publish or what not to
publish. 245 Thus, the fact of the arrest can be reported by the news
media.24 6 But once the charges have been dismissed and the individual exonerated, the records may be closed or destroyed and
therefore access to them denied. The press' right to publish is simply not directly affected by such a practice.
Since there is no infringement of the freedom of the press the
state is not required to show a compelling state interest but rather
a rational basis between the regulation and the legitimate objective it seeks to achieve. Still, critics of expungement and sealing
laws assert there are less drastic alternatives which would provide
more adequate relief.247 Those that have been suggested are: (1)
requiring complete and accurate records; 246 (2) prohibiting inquiry
about non-conviction arrest records; 249 (3) making the records
more available to insure accuracy 25° and (4) changing social attitudes through education and supporting legislation. 251 However, it
is not at all clear that these alternatives are satisfactory. Granted,
part of the problem is the dissemination of inaccurate and incomplete records. Nevertheless, even assuming this problem could be
cured by requiring accuracy, expungement or sealing laws would
still be needed. An accurate arrest record creates the same problem as an inaccurate one; there is a tendency to equate an arrest
the "undoubted 'social
with a conviction. Accuracy does not cure
25 2
stigma' involved in an arrest record."
VI.

CONCLUSION

The problems inherent in the vast dissemination of criminal
records cannot be ignored. The overwhelming impact these
records have on prospects of employment and schooling as well as
the use to which they are put by law enforcement agencies demonstrates the need for some sort of protection of the individual
against abuse and misuse. Because the equitable expungement

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

and press to various kinds of official records, such as records of juvenile-court
proceedings." Id. at n.26.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
400 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
The right to publish such information would be protected by the first amendment and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). See also Tennessean Newspaper, Inc. v. Levi, 403 F. Supp. 1318 (M.D. Tenn. 1975).
See, e.g., Comment, supra note 7, at 529.
Id.
Id.
Kogon & Loughery, supra note 9, at 388.
Id.
Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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relief by the courts has been scarce, it is to state legislatures that
individuals look for relief.
The legislative response has been haphazard in those states
where expungement or sealing laws have been enacted. Other
states, such as Nebraska, have consistently refused to enact protective legislation of any kind. It is suggested that, at a minimum,
relief for a person "wrongfully arrested" or "factually innocent" is
imperative. Additionally, due to the presumption of innocence
there is no legitimate reason for retaining records of other exonerated arrestees. As to conviction records, lines can be drawn, for
example, on the basis of the seriousness of the crime. In any
event, legislation is needed to avoid the "social stigma" in criminal
records-some type of provision for relief is long overdue.
Linda S. Buethe '79

